Articles by SAE International

Counterfeit electronic parts: Manufacture of and avoidance

If a counterfeit electronic part is installed in critical technology such as aircraft, spacecraft, or missiles, the consequences can be quite drastic. The equipment or the product could quit working or not work when needed or fail when put under stress. The cost to replace counterfeit electronic parts can be quite expensive as the Missile Defense Agency testified in November 2011 at the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) hearing on counterfeit electronic parts in the Department of Defense (DoD) supply chain: the cost to replace suspect counterfeit memory devices in the THAAD missiles was $2.7 million.

As a result of the 2011 hearing and related legislation, DoD through the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council was tasked to define what a counterfeit electronic part was along with other DoD contract requirements. DoD defines a counterfeit electronic part as: "An unlawful or unauthorized reproduction, substitution, or alteration that has been knowingly mismarked, misidentified, or otherwise misrepresented to be an authentic, unmodified electronic part from the original manufacturer, or a source with the express written authority of the original manufacturer or current design activity, including an authorized aftermarket manufacturer. Unlawful or unauthorized substitution includes used electronic parts represented as new, or the false identification of grade, serial number, lot number, date code, or performance characteristics." Read more

2015-02-25

Kirsten M. Koepsel, Intellectual Property Policy Analyst

The role of traceability and inspections, tests, and other methods in counterfeit electronic part avoidance

Give customers clear guidance on authorized distributors

Henry Livingston,

Engineering Fellow & Technical Director, BAE Systems Electronic Systems

The origins of traceability for the purpose of counterfeit electronic part avoidance derived from the fact that counterfeit electronic parts tend to enter the supply chain through the open market. The purchase and use of counterfeits can be avoided if one (a) acquires electronic parts from the original component manufacturer (OCM) or the OCM's authorized distributors, or (b) can confirm the hand offs of parts to the OCM or the OCM's authorized distributors. Some independent distributors acquire electronic parts from an OCM or the OCM's authorized distributors and can confirm these transactions. In the case of electronic parts acquired from the open market, however, suppliers generally cannot confirm traceability to the OCM or the OCM's authorized distributors. It is this inability to confirm traceability to the OCM or the OCM's authorized distributors that prompts the need to apply inspections, tests, and other methods designed to avoid the procurement and use of counterfeits. This procurement risk mitigation process is described in SAE Aerospace Standard AS5553. [1] Taking a cue from government and industry subject matter experts, Congress included this expectation in the original legislation that initiated the final rule under DFARS Case 2012-D055. [2]

An organization meets the traceability requirements of AS5553 and the objective of DFARS 252.246-7007(c)(2) and 252.246-7007(c)(4) if the organization establishes and applies processes and procedures that:

(a) assure procurement from the OCM or the OCM's authorized distributors

The organization needs not seek out traceability (and associated artifacts mapping the path to the OCM) when it purchases parts from the OCM itself or when it purchases parts from the OCM's authorized distributors. The organi-zation's procurement and receiving records confirming the organization's source should suffice.

(b) confirm traceability to the OCM for parts procured from other suppliers

If the organization uses a supplier to acquire material on the organization's behalf (such as an SDB to meet FAR requirements for small business set asides), that supplier needs to provide evidence that it acquired the material from the OCM itself or from the OCM's authorized distributors (e.g. the organization directs the sourcing to the OCM or the OCM's authorized distributors and the organization previously evaluated the supplier's ability to follow instructions). The organization's procurement and receiving records confirming its supplier's source should suffice.

(c) apply inspections, tests, and other methods designed to intercept and avoid the use of counterfeits when una-ble to confirm traceability to the OCM or the OCM's authorized distributors.

If the organization finds a compelling need to seek out material from a supplier who plans to acquire material from, or possesses inventory acquired from other suppliers who are not the OCM's authorized distributors (e.g. purported 'authentic OEM surplus,' parts sourced from the open market, parts acquired from DLA, etc.), the organization should seek out and evaluate the integrity of supply chain traceability information mapping the path to the OCM (e.g. contact the intermediaries and OCM to verify the evidence provided, verifying the evidence provided is associated with the parts supplied, etc.) and seek out information to verify adequate storage and handling. In the absence of verifiable traceability data and proof of adequate storage and handling, and in the absence of support from the OCM, the organization should see to the performance of tests and inspections designed to detect counterfeit electronic parts. The outcome of these tests and inspections should serve as the basis for "credible evidence" providing "reasonable doubt that the electronic part is authentic."

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References:

¹SAE Aerospace Standard AS5553, Appendix B - Purchasing Process, Figure B3 - Procurement Risk Mitigation.

²H.R.1540: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Sec. 818. Detection and Avoidance of Coun-terfeit Electronic Parts
NOTE: Acquiring material from the OCM or the OCM's authorized distributor remains the most effective way to avoid counterfeit electronic parts. Seeking out material from a supplier who plans to acquire material from, or possesses inventory acquired from other suppliers who are not the OCM's authorized distributors, should only be considered when compelling need precludes acquiring material from the OCM or the OCM's authorized distributor.

2013-01-04

Henry Livingston, Engineering Fellow & Technical Director, BAE Systems Electronic Systems

Counterfeit prevention and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) electronics

Give customers clear guidance on authorized distributors

Henry Livingston,

Engineering Fellow & Technical Director, BAE Systems Electronic Systems

In its June 2000 report on "Commercial Item Acquisition: Considerations and Lessons Learned" , the U.S. Department of Defense advised that the use of commercial items "frequently means embracing commercial business practices that are embedded in the commercial item" and "many DoD requirements must be adjusted to accommodate both the vendor's anticipated uses of the commercial item and the vendor's business practices."

In the case of electronic parts, industry and U.S. government subject matter experts agree that the best way to avoid counterfeits is to buy these electronic parts from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or its authorized distributors. A commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) product OEM will frequently advise its customers that the best way to avoid counterfeits of its finished products is to purchase them directly from the OEM or its authorized dealer. It is common, however, for the COTS OEM or its authorized dealer to refuse requirements from customers dictating procurement, reporting, and remediation practices such as those described with FY12 NDAA§818.

Defense contractors and DoD procurement organizations are frequently faced with a COTS producer's business practice of not accepting such requirements, regardless of what the reality of their procurement, reporting, or remediation practices may be. This is particularly the case for high-volume electronics product lines developed for the commercial market, such as IT hardware products, where DoD and its contractors generally do not have the buying power to influence a COTS producer's business practices for a specific, small-volume procurement.

A review of DoD solicitations reveals that some DoD organizations have made adjustments to accommodate the COTS producer's business practices. Some solicitations require the purchase of COTS products from the OEM or a "Manufacturer Authorized Partner" (consistent with best practice espoused by industry), and also require the supplier to "warrant that the products are new, in their original box." Others call for the supplier to disclose its "counterfeit parts screening procedure and other technical information demonstrating that the supplier can provide the required hardware." None of these solicitations flow down requirements dictating electronic part procurement, reporting, and remediation practices described in FY12 NDAA §818.

Counterfeit prevention practices should address the COTS producer's business practices and its compatibility with the specific counterfeit parts avoidance methodology described in FY12 NDAA§818:

For COTS electronic assemblies that fit the definition of "Commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) item" definition under FAR 2.101, these items should be purchased directly from the OEM or its authorized dealer in lieu of flowing down part level counterfeit prevention clauses.
Supply chain traceability applies to the assembly and not to parts contained within the assembly. Documentation for supply chain traceability may include a Certificate of Conformance (C of C, CoC), a Certificate of Conformance and Supply Chain Traceability (CoCT), a packing list, an invoice, purchase receipt records, or other documentation.
For COTS electronic assemblies used in critical applications, an application risk assessment and mitigation plan should be performed.

Proposals for industry standards activity to address counterfeit prevention associated with COTS products should consider these recommendations.

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References:

¹"Commercial Item Acquisition:
Considerations and Lessons Learned," June 26, 2000 Reference Link

²Examples of solicitations shown in FedBizOps.gov (https://www.fbo.gov/) include:
Solicitation Number: H92257-13-Q-0024, 26 Feb 2013;
Solicitation Number: HQ0515-3018-0001-000, 15 Feb 2013;
Solicitation Number: N0017812Q4488, 03 Aug 2012

2013-10-06

Henry Livingston, Engineering Fellow & Technical Director, BAE Systems Electronic Systems

Why an authenticity marking standard is needed now
An industry/government agreement on an authenticity marking standard is the critical next step for Section 818

Janice Meraglia,

Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.

Mitchell Miller,

Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.

ABSTRACT: Consensus has been elusive between industry and government on the new Rule enforcing anti-counterfeiting wording in National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012, Section 818. An immediate practical step is needed to address what is threatening to become an impasse on the issue. Adoption of an authenticity marking standard represents a specific way in which the industry can begin to comply with the new Rule. This need not be a definitive recipe, but can be delivered as guidance. Nor does this need to be holistic from the start; this is may begin as partial and practical, and will evolve and grow as the Federal and supplier working relationship against counterfeits grows. Without losing the flexibility of the current Rule, and without trying to impose an unworkable single solution, the government can establish ways industry can move forward right away.

The Federal Registry has published it. Every major stakeholder has commented on it. The Office of Secretary of Defense has been preparing internally for it. And a definitive Rule proposed in DFARS Case 2012-D055 is now due to be published in September.

The shouting, in sum, should be over.

But if anything, the noise level is higher than ever.

The uproar is over the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2012, Section 818, requiring that suppliers implement a systemto monitor and prevent counterfeit electronics. That legislation and the DFARS Rule which will partly implement it- which we will call Rule D055--has been a storm center from the beginning, and continues to rage to this very day. No sooner was the ink dry on the NDAA FY '12, signed by the President at midnight, December 31, then the Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA), began pleading for more consultation and more deliberation time, warning that the new legislation would "reshape the entire defense industrial base." Today, a year and half later, as Rule D055 emerged for public comment in June, important groups such as AIA continue to argue for longer deliberations, and more guidance.

Yet, with renewed worry in national security circles about sabotaged parts hiding in the vast sea of counterfeits, the threat has begun to cast, if anything, a more threatening and immediate shadow. The DoD Defense Science Board noted urgently in January, 2013 that "there is a nexus between cyber threat and relabeled and counterfeit hardware in DoD systems. Both DoD and industry counterfeit mitigation efforts should be developed further in conjunction with DoD cyber defense efforts." With these concerns pressing harder than ever, neither the Department nor Congress seems in a mood to "deliberate" for very long before even beginning to take action.

Moreover, the Department is clearly focused on "prevention and early warning," as the "primary" defense against counterfeits, (see Under Secretary Frank Kendall's April 26, 2013 memo "DoD Counterfeit Prevention Policy.") a proactive and strategic approach for which the industry is almost certainly not ready. As one spokesman for an industry group put it: "…my guess is there will be very few companies that will be able to comply from day one."⁴

In this paper, we propose practical steps to break out of this seeming impasse.

The industry viewpoint

For all the warnings of clear and present danger, counterfeiting is a complicated issue, that is certain. There is undoubtedly no one-size-fits-all solution for a $300 billion industry, whose products range from advanced, custom-designed microcircuits, to the tiny single-minded diode. That is one reason why Rule D055 has clearly been designed with flexibility in mind and in some ways has seemed to steer away from specific solutions and best practices, qualities that naturally grate on and confuse the industry. Is it possible to prescribe specific steps while still maintaining the flexibility needed to regulate such a formidable industry? We believe it is.

What is at the heart of the industry's objections to Rule D055? It is fundamentally the perception that, as written, the relevant language in the Rule imposes a penalty-driven, and not incentive-driven regime.⁵ The industry believes no exit is being offered from its financial liability for rework and replacement costs, no safe harbors like those which do exist for civil and criminal liability. No matter how rigorous are its measures and systems, the industry seems to assert, it still risks liability in a variety of scenarios. For medium to smaller concerns, this is posed as an existential concern: firms are worried they simply will not be able to survive in such a regulatory climate.

To oversimplify perhaps, the industry is looking for a regulatory regime which rewards contractors for doing the right thing, and does not mainly rely on setting out draconian consequences for doing the wrong thing.

This is compounded by a lack of specifics in Rule D055. While best practices have been set forth in the industry, such as SAE's AS5553, there is no reference to them in the Rule. So the "right thing"-the tests for effective "anti-counterfeit systems" called for in the Rule, steps which are acceptable to OSD--are seen as not well defined.

Also, industry observers notice that Section 818 calls for a "risk-based" approach to eliminating counterfeits, targeting first and primarily the most vulnerable and sensitive parts. But the Rule gives no guidance about how its suppliers can phase in anti-counterfeiting measures based on risk.

The good news, we think, is this: to the extent that contractors are looking for a practical solution, for immediate steps which will be acceptable to OSD, and are not simply foot-dragging, we think there are indeed practical actions that can be advocated by the Department. And we believe the Department is searching for such actions. As a senior official expressed to this author at a recent public hearing, industry buy-in and consensus is a foremost goal for the Department.

Without losing the flexibility of the current Rule, and without trying to impose an unworkable unitary solution, the DoD can establish ways that the industry can move forward right away. These need not be a definitive recipe, but can be delivered as guidance. Nor do these need to be holistic from the start; they may begin as partial and practical, and will evolve and grow as the Federal and supplier working relationship against counterfeits grows.

As we advocate below, we think a standard authenticity marking protocol for electronic parts, of the highest security and stability, can be such a step. A authenticity marking program has been thoroughly tested by DLA, and, because it involves quarantine of suspect parts, is inherently preventative. Authenticity marking is already cited in the NASA Reauthorization Act of 2012, as a way of enforcing a trusted or approved electronics manufacturers list.⁶

Common Ground?

Let us attempt to summarize the contours of possible common ground:

Industry expressed need:

Guidance: best practices and practical steps
Consultative role in shaping guidelines
Rule flexibility based on varying commodities, production flows, industry segmentsMove from strict liability/punishment regime to incentive-driven regime
Risk-based approach

OSD expressed need:

Urgent actions based on continuing spike in counterfeits in military supply chains, and immediate threat of sabotage through cyber exploitation
Rule flexibility by allowing industry to lead
Industry buy-in and consensus
Primary emphasis on preventative and early warning systems
Offer specific ways in which the industry can immediately begin to comply, yet allow this guidance to evolve and grow.

A marking protocol as a practical step

In October 2012, SAE published our white paper "Traceability in the Age of Globalization, A Proposal for a Marking Protocol to Assure Authenticity of Electronic Parts." In this paper we called for an industry and OSD-backed standard for a mark that would assure the originality and identity of electronic parts. The mark could be implemented by various technologies and would not be geared to any one vendor, as long as the information delivery-the assurance of originality-was uniform and the platform chosen was at the highest level of quality, including stability and security.

This mark is not seen as a serialized identifier, such as the IUID standard, although the two are not exclusive. It aims to remain as simple and therefore effective as possible-a robust, uncopyable mark which assures the origin or the immediate source of a part. We believed then and now that there is a benefit to solutions which are quickly practicable, tested, and proven. We wrote:

We believe that such a standard for marking to origin for high reliability electronics is possible and necessary; more, it is the order of the day. Success depends first and foremost on the quality of the mark, especially its absolute resistance to malicious back-engineering and reproduction. The mark itself must not be counterfeited. There are those who say that may not be possible, but we think we can demonstrate that it is. In a more visionary sense, if our defense industrial base can produce ballistic missiles which can intercept others in mid-flight, surely we can accomplish this.

Marking standards are far from marginal in electronics. Indeed, one could say that they have been at the center of standards proliferation for decades. 2-D bar code marks and other machine-readable marks have become critical to traceability and transparency in electronics, MIL-STD-130 provides detailed marking guidance, and the IUID standard has been an approach. The table below lists marking standards already playing a key role in government and industry:

Industry Specification & Guidelines
International Standards
ISO/IEC 16022	Bar Code Symbology Specification - Data Matrix
ISO/IEC 15415	Bar Code Print Quality Test Specification - Two-Dimensional symbols
Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG) Standards
B-1	Bar Code Symbology Standard
B-4	Parts Identification and Tracking Application Standard
B-13	2D Symbology White Paper
B-14	Guidelines for use of Two-Dimensional Symbols with the B-10 Trading Partner Labels
B-17	2D Direct Parts Marking Guideline
U.S. Dept. of Defense (DoD) Standards
MIL-STD-130	Identification Marking of U.S. Military Property
Air Transport Association (ATA) and International Aerospace Quality Group (IAQG) Standards
ATA Spec 2000 Chapter 9	Automated Identification and Data Capture
AS9132	Data Matrix (2D) Coding Quality Requirements for Parts Marking
NASA Standards
NASA-STD -6002	Applying Data Matrix Identification Symbols on Aerospace Parts
NASA-HDBK -6003	Application of Data Matrix Identification Symbols to Aerospace Parts using Direct Part Marking Methods/Techniques
Electronics Industry Association (EIA)
EIA 706	Component Marking
EIA 802	Product Marking

We believe that the time for such a marking standard specifically to mitigate the risk of counterfeit electronics, has come.

Today, the Defense Logistics Agency has taken the lead in anti-counterfeiting practices with a program of four initiatives including use of SigNature DNA marking. The program should be explored and leveraged by DoD; it provides ample evidence and rich experience in the benefits of a marking standard.

Tomorrow concrete steps can be taken by both industry and government. On the industry side a standards committee perhaps under aegis of SAE, could be tasked with the job of creating an authenticity marking standard. We would hope that OSD could then make it clear that exploring such a standard is it in its area of favorable consideration for compliance with rule DO55. Simple effective steps can begin the job of moving toward an elusive, but critically necessary public and private sector alliance on this watershed issue.

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References:

¹Council of Defense and Space Industry Association (CODSIA), Open Letter, "Subject: Implementation of Section 818, Detection and Avoidance of Counterfeit Electronic Parts, National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, To: Mr. Richard T. Ginman, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, and Mr. Alan F. Estevez, Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (OUSD (AT&L))" February 21, 2012. Reference Link

²Defense Science Board Task Force on Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat, "Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat," January, 2013 Reference Link

³Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 4140.67, "DoD Counterfeit Prevention Policy: " b. Employ a risk-based approach to reduce the frequency and impact of counterfeit materiel within DoD acquisition systems and DoD life-cycle sustainment processes by: (1) Applying prevention and early detection procedures to minimize the presence of counterfeit materiel within the DoD supply chain as the primary strategy in eliminating counterfeit materiel within the DoD."

⁴Chvotkin, Alan, "Defense contractors aren't ready to comply with anti-counterfeit rule," next.gov, August 8, 2013.

⁵We use the terminology of Robert Metzger in his insightful address to the CALCE Symposium on Counterfeit Electronic Parts, on June 25-6, 2013 in College Park, Maryland, where Metzger asks whether Section 818 ought to impose "an incentive or penalty-driven regime."

⁶34 See NASA Authorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 111-267 §1206(c)(2), 124 Stat. 2805, 2843-44 (2010) ("The criteria may include - (A) authentication or encryption codes; (B) embedded security markings in parts; (C) unique, harder to copy labels and markings; (D) identifying distinct lot and serial codes on external packaging; (E) radio frequency identification embedded into high value parts; (F) physical destruction of all defective, damaged, and sub-standard parts that are by-products of the manufacturing process; (G) testing certifications; (H) maintenance of procedures for handling any counterfeit parts that slip through; (I) maintenance of secure facilities to prevent

2013-09-13

Janice Meraglia and Mitchell Miller, Applied DNA Sciences, Inc

What is not enough and what is too much when it comes to electrical test for counterfeit mitigation for EEE devices?

Give customers clear guidance on authorized distributors

Sultan Ali Lilani,

Technical Business
Development Manager,

Integra Technologies,
LLC

The extent of electrical testing that is required to authenticate the product in question must take into consideration the application and the risks (product risk, component risk, and supplier risk) associated with the application. It is imperative that we understand the risk level and what we are trying to accomplish when a test plan is set up. Although full datasheet electrical testing is most desirable for any counterfeit mitigation testing, such full electrical testing can be cost-prohibitive-and in some cases may not be possible given the time constraints of the project.

To devise the optimal test plan for counterfeit mitigation, five essential items should be considered:

Technology-specific test engineers

EEE devices come in all kinds of flavors: discrete, passives, digital, analog, linear, memory, FPGA, SERDES, microcontrollers, A/D, D/A, connectors, relays, inductors, magnetics, and more.
Integra Technologies considers it imperative that technology-specific test engineers develop the test software used to electrically test the suspect EEE device. This is important because it is easy to under-test the devices (very little test coverage) or have an extended test program (unnecessary testing with little applicable test coverage).

Technology-specific test equipment

To get the best test coverage at the most reasonable cost, it is necessary to use automated test equipment (ATE) specifically designed and configured to test the EEE device. For example, a digital device tester with add-on analog test instrumentation is not the optimal ATE to test a mixed-signal device in terms of test coverage and cost. Using the right device tester also results in a quicker test solution.

Understanding the customer's application

Understanding the customer's application and the functionality of the device allows for efficient testing-testing that involves only the portion of the EEE device that will be used by the customer. Testing any portion of the device for ac, dc, or functionality does not guarantee that the test coverage needed for the device testing has been applied in the test plan. For example, testing the A/D converter portion of the FPGA as a representative block may not be a representative test scheme if the A/D converter block is not used in customer application.
Integra Technologies has learned that it is important for the test engineers from the test lab to engage with the component or systems engineer to determine what functionality the device is used for and the best overall test plan.

Creating the right test plan

It is important to create a test plan commensurate with the customer's requirements. For example, customers may require static dc testing to be performed. Static dc testing is the most misunderstood test terminology; many test labs interpret it as is a purely dc test, and in many cases it is interpreted as a Curve Tracer or IV testing. An experienced test engineer will understand that static dc testing does not always mean no dynamic signals are needed during test. To get VOH/VOL tested, it is most likely that appropriate dynamic signals may be needed as inputs.

What to look for in selecting a test lab to perform the most effective electrical testing

Does the lab have device-specific knowledge in terms of testability or understanding customer's application?
Does the lab have technology-specific ATEs?
Does the lab have demonstrated hands-on experience in developing the test programs over multiple projects?
Does the lab have back-up ATEs and test engineers to get the job done in case of unforeseen issues with equipment or personnel?
Does the lab have the appropriate industry-specific certifications?

Integra Technologies believes that the electrical testing of EEE device does not have to be a very expensive proposition as long as the customer's test requirements are clearly understood, appropriate tools are applied, and experienced test engineers are used.

2013-07-19

By Sultan Ali Lilani, Technical Business Development Manager, Integra Technologies, LLC

Give customers clear guidance on authorized distributors

The counterfeiting of electronic components is a hot topic in the industry and a growing concern for customers and the government. Customers need to be able to quickly and confidently identify authorized distributors.

As a result, several organizations and the federal government are developing requirements that customers obtain proof of a distributor's authorization. The primary method for this verification is the website of the original component manufacturer (OCM).

While many OCMs have websites that make it easy to find a list of their authorized distributors, others do not. And, some manufacturers fail to even include a list.

ECIA (Electronic Components Industry Association) is working on a number of fronts to assist customers in finding authorized inventory through www.eciaauthorized.com and by encouraging OCMs to clearly identify their authorized distributors on the OCMs' websites. To further assist OCMs, the Association has developed the following suggestions that will enable your customers to find your products from your authorized distributors:

Make the list of authorized distributors easy to find on your website.
Make the link less complex with no long, cryptic keys. A single link to a single distributor is preferable.
Make the list easily printable. Customers often want to save or print the page for their records.
Identify distributors by region and clearly note any geographic limitations.
Provide a list by region rather than a pull-down or search menu.
It is not necessary to list distributor branch offices.
Clearly label your distributors as "authorized distributor" since this will match the terminology used in the standards and by ECIA.
If it is your company policy, consider adding a statement to your website reminding customers that only product purchased directly from your company or from your authorized distributors is covered by your warranty.
Keep the list updated with new authorizations and terminations.
Clearly indicate whether products obtained by distributors through master distributors and buying groups are considered authorized.

These are important steps that OCMs can take to enable customers to find where to buy their products and to ensure the integrity of the authorized supply chain.

2013-06-17

Robin Gray, Chief Operating Officer, Electronic Components Industry Association

SAE G-19 Committee making progress on counterfeit parts standards

Countering the counterfeiters

Mitigation of counterfeit aerospace electronic parts through use of standards

A Long History of Setting the Standard

Henry Livingston's Counterfeit Parts Blog

Traceability Requirements to Avoid Counterfeit Electronic Parts – the G19CI proposal

2014-11-18

The SAE G19CI committee recently put forward a proposed revision to AS5553 for ballot. This proposed revision included the following requirement … “Traceability of EEE Parts acquired from other than Authorized Suppliers shall be tracked to the lowest level of serialized assemblies.” I can interpret this requirement in several ways. Here are a few examples […]

FAR / DFAR Case Update (17 Nov 2014)

2014-11-17

Status updates from the ‘Open Cases Reports’ … DFARS Case 2012-D055: Detection and Avoidance of Counterfeit Electronic Parts 05/06/2014 Final rule published on Federal Register. (79 FR 26091) DFARS Case 2014-D005: Detection and Avoidance of Counterfeit Electronic Parts—Further Implementation11/07/2013 DARC Director tasked DARS staff to draft proposed DFARS rule. Report due 01/29/2014. 01/31/2014 Report due date extended to 4/23/2014. […]

FAR / DFAR Case Update (17 Nov 2014)

2014-11-17

Chip Industry’s ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) Facelift Comes With Security Wrinkle | EE Times

2014-11-14

“… on the path to IoT, the issue of data and device security looms large. … For Reinhard Ploss, CEO of Infineon Technologies, this is actually a plus. ‘The semiconductor industry opportunity is hardwired security to provide a backbone to which all applications can be attached.’ For this to happen, however, semiconductor companies must also […]

Chip Industry’s ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) Facelift Comes With Security Wrinkle | EE Times

2014-11-14

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Henry Livingston's Counterfeit Parts Blog